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Resumen
Este trabajo examina tres preguntas. Primero, ¿países con sistemas gubernamentales/burocráticos
relativamente débiles imponen restricciones regulatorias más rigurosas sobre las actividades de los
bancos? Segundo, ¿países con sistemas regulatorios más restrictivos tienen sistemas bancarios de
pobre desempeño? Tercero, ¿países con sistemas regulatorios más restrictivos tienen una menor
probabilidad de sufrir una crisis bancaria?. Encontramos que las respuestas son como siguen. Países
con sistemas gubernamentales/burocráticos débiles tienden a imponer restricciones regulatorias más
rigurosas sobre las actividades de los bancos. Existe evidencia variada respecto al impacto de
restricciones regulatorias sobre el desempeño de los bancos. Finalmente, encontramos que países
que restringen las actividades de mercados de activos financieros tienden a tener sistemas bancarios
más frágiles.
Abstract
This paper examines three questions. First, do countries with relatively weak government/
bureaucratic systems impose harsher regulatory restrictions on activities of banks?  Second, do
countries with more restrictive regulatory systems have poorly functioning banking systems?
Third, do countries with more restrictive regulatory systems have a lower probability of suffering a
banking crisis? We find that the answers are as follows. Countries with weak government/
bureaucratic systems tend to impose harsher regulatory restrictions on the activities of banks. There
is mixed evidence regarding the impact of regulatory restrictions on bank performance. Finally, we
find that countries that restrict securities market activities tend to have more fragile banking
systems.
____________________
This paper is a chapter of the forthcoming book Banking, Financial Integration, and International Crises,
edited by Leonardo Hernández and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, Banco Central de Chile, Santiago, 2002.
E-mail: jbarth@milkeninstitute.org; gcaprio@worldbank.org; rlevine@csom.umn.edu.1 Financial Regulation and Performance
1
The unprecedented number of costly bank failures throughout
the world in the last two decades of the twentieth century has fo-
cused attention on the need to determine more appropriate ways to
improve the performance of countries’ financial systems. Indeed, a
substantial literature is already emerging on the causes and conse-
quences of  banking—crises and on various reforms that might help
prevent future crises.1 Although the proposed reforms differ in im-
portant respects, nearly all include changes in existing financial regu-
lations and supervisory standards. This core of agreement is certainly
understandable, insofar as financial crises in countries ranging from
the United States and Japan, to Korea and Mexico, to Chile and Thai-
land, to India and Russia, and to Ghana and Hungary have been blamed
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In response to this recent and troubling situation, the World Bank,
the International Monetary Fund, and other international financial
institutions are attempting to promote financial stability and economic
development by more vigorously urging countries to adopt and then
implement appropriate regulations and supervisory practices for their
financial sectors. The World Bank, for instance, in virtually all its
financial sector reviews and projects, now stresses more than ever
the importance of prudential regulation and supervision. The over-
whelmingly widespread belief is that many countries can significantly
improve upon their existing financial systems, thereby reducing the
likelihood of financial instability and facilitating long-run economic
growth. More generally, the belief appears universal among those
who have studied these issues that inappropriate regulations and
supervisory standards not only retard a country’s long-run rate of
economic growth but also increase the likelihood of a financial crisis
that could spread beyond the country’s own borders.
Remarkably, however, despite all the agreement on the need for
financial reform, there is relatively little empirical evidence to sup-
port any concrete advice regarding either specific or comprehensive
regulatory and supervisory reforms. The reason for this awkward
situation is that detailed cross-country comparisons of financial regu-
latory and supervisory systems for developing countries do not yet
exist.2 Without such information, economists have nonetheless been
able to conclude that incentives are critical in understanding the
behavior of the different agents that comprise the financial sector. In
this regard, it is now recognized that the moral hazard problem has
become more widespread and hence explains in part the recent world-
wide outbreak of banking crises.3 Economists have not yet been able
to reach a conclusion, however, about the most appropriate way to
correct the incentive and moral hazard problems facing banks, such
as by requiring higher (and more narrowly defined) capital-to-asset
ratios, mandating stricter definition and disclosure of nonperforming
loans, requiring that subordinated debt be issued, or installing “world-
class” supervision.
2. Barth, Nolle, and Rice (1997) provide fairly detailed comparative informa-
tion on bank regulatory and supervisory systems for nineteen countries: the
Group of Ten (G-10) large industrial countries and the other members of the
European Union. They provide relatively little analysis, however, of appropriate
reforms for these systems.
3. More generally, the moral hazard problem, when not contained, gives rise
to an inefficient allocation of resources.3 Financial Regulation and Performance
The inability to reach a conclusion about specific ways to resolve
these serious problems is not surprising, given that data on the prac-
tices of various financial regulatory and supervisory authorities for a
wide range of countries have not been assembled and analyzed. This
lack of information is quite important because it means that current
efforts to reform financial regulation and supervision are occurring
without knowing whether or under what circumstances these efforts
will be successful. One should realize, moreover, that in situations in
which the salaries of supervisors are only 5 to 10 percent of those
of the supervised, or in which individuals can easily move (and usu-
ally with ample financial gain) from careers as regulators to careers
with the regulated firms, reform efforts are unlikely to be truly
successful.
To characterize the lack of financial regulatory and supervisory
data more concretely, even information on the extent to which banks
in different developing countries are allowed to, and do, engage in
various securities, insurance, and real estate activities has not yet
been compiled and analyzed. Nor is there any systematic compilation
and analysis of information, for a broad cross section of countries, on
whether they allow banks to own or be owned by nonfinancial firms.
Yet the extent to which these specific banking activities or banking
and commerce interrelationships inhibit or promote the development
of an efficient and stable financial system, or increase or decrease
the likelihood of a banking crisis, is largely unknown without such
information. In short, many important and pressing questions re-
garding the appropriate way to reform financial sector regulation and
supervision in many countries throughout the world cannot today be
adequately answered.
Research on these types of issues, therefore, is of critical impor-
tance because it will enable researchers to better identify the par-
ticular mix of regulations and supervisory standards that promotes
well-functioning financial systems. With this identification, one would
then be in a position to provide better guidance to policymakers on
appropriate financial sector reforms. Ongoing research is already sig-
nificantly improving our understanding of the broad relationships
between the type of legal system existing within a country and its
financial sector development.4 The somewhat narrower research dis-
cussed here complements this other work.
4. See La Porta and others (1997, 1998), Levine (1998), and Levine, Loayza,
and Beck (2000).James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio, Jr., and Ross Levine 4
This paper focuses on the regulation and supervision of the
banking sector.5 Efforts to collect detailed and comprehensive infor-
mation on the different financial regulatory and supervisory environ-
ments that exist in the approximately 200 countries throughout the
world are just beginning, and at present only partial information is
available for about fifty countries. Given this situation, we make use
of the information that is available. Fortunately, the recently obtained
data include information on the degree to which regulatory restric-
tions are imposed on several important and even controversial activi-
ties of banks. This newer information, together with that previously
gathered, enables us to examine empirically for the first time, albeit
in a preliminary manner, the interrelationships among some impor-
tant regulatory, governmental, and financial variables.
Specifically, the following three questions are examined—and
briefly answered—in this paper:
• Do countries with relatively weak government or bureaucratic
systems impose harsher regulatory restrictions on the activities of
banks? We find that the answer to this question is yes.
• Do countries with more restrictive regulatory systems have
poorly functioning banking systems? The evidence is mixed.
• Do countries with more restrictive regulatory systems have a
lower probability of suffering a banking crisis? The answer is no. In
fact, the results indicate that the opposite is the case: In countries in
which the securities activities of banks are restricted, the likelihood
of a banking crisis is greater, ceteris paribus.
The third finding contradicts those who believe that stricter
restrictions on the allowable activities of banks constrains excessive
risk-taking behavior, partly by making banks easier for both the
supervisory authorities and market participants to monitor.6 Two
forces may be at work to produce such a result. First, to the extent
that more narrowly defined banking activities (such as making loans)
and broader financial activities (such as securities and insurance
5. It should be noted, however, that in many developing and emerging market
economies the banking sector is the most important component of the financial
system.
6. In the case of the U.S. savings and loan debacle, despite the fact that
unitary thrift holding companies had comparatively few restrictions on their ac-
tivities, including the mixing of banking and commerce, these broader powers
were not found to be a significant factor. See, for example, Barth (1996).5 Financial Regulation and Performance
activities) are not highly and positively correlated, banks in coun-
tries that allow broader powers are able to benefit by being more
diversified in their operations. This reduces the likelihood of both
failures and crises.7 Second, Hellmann, Murdoch, and Stiglitz (1998)
demonstrate that, by imposing one specific restriction—deposit in-
terest rate ceilings—on banks, a country may obtain a more robust
banking system, mainly because of the resulting higher franchise
value. Our findings, however, indicate that harsher restrictions on
those banks’ activities considered here are likely to  lower franchise
value, either by limiting profits (by reducing economies of scale and
scope) or by increasing the variability of profits (by leaving average
profits unchanged but reducing the market value of those profits to
the extent that investors prefer less rather than more volatility).8
This means that reducing, if not totally eliminating, these restric-
tions would allow greater diversification and thereby enhance fran-
chise value. This regulatory reform, in turn, would induce more
 incentive-compatible behavior on the part of banks.9 The gain from
allowing broader banking powers appears to more than offset what-
ever added complications such a move toward “universal banking”
would imply for monitoring.10
These empirical results, of course, are preliminary. A more
extensive data set will be assembled to permit analysis of a wider
variety of regulatory issues. An attempt will also be made to obtain
indicators of the ability of supervisory authorities and market par-
ticipants to monitor banks. The database, moreover, will be expanded
beyond the fifty countries in our sample, thereby increasing the power
of the empirical tests. For a discussion of data and additional analy-
ses, see Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001, a, b, c).
Despite the preliminary nature of these results, they do seem
sufficiently robust that policymakers should consider them, along
7. See Caprio and Wilson (1997) for evidence identifying a link between a lack of
diversification and bank failures in selected countries.
8. Bankers frequently lament that restrictions on their ability to engage in in-
vestment banking activities excludes them from more profitable lines of business.
However, it should not be the case, at least in the long run, that one sector will have
a consistently higher profit rate than another, other things equal. For this reason,
the argument based on economies of scale and scope is more persuasive with respect
to eliminating the restrictions.
9. Some argue, moreover, that bank ownership of nonfinancial firms may im-
prove corporate governance.
10. From an empirical analysis, Puri (1996) concludes that universal banks are
better than investment banks at underwriting securities.James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio, Jr., and Ross Levine 6
with the results of other recent work on banking crises, in decid-
ing upon the most appropriate way in which to reform bank regu-
lation. More specifically, this and other recent research suggests
that several initial steps could be taken to reduce significantly the
likelihood of banking crises. Countries could, among other things,
develop and improve legal systems and information disclosure (see
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997, 1998); impose rate ceilings
on bank deposits (Hellmann, Murdoch, and Stiglitz, 1998); estab-
lish limits either on the rate at which banks can expand credit or
on the rate of increase in their exposure to certain sectors, such
as real estate (see Caprio, Atiyas, and Hanson, 1994, and Barth
and others, 1998); require greater diversification of bank portfo-
lios (see Caprio and Wilson, 1997); and, on the basis of the results
reported in this paper, reduce the restrictions on the range of
activities in which banks can engage. Determining which combina-
tions of these recommendations are most appropriate for indi-
vidual countries at different stages of development should be the
subject of future empirical research.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1
reviews some of the recent literature on the relationship between
bank regulation and supervision and banking sector performance,
and the reasons why this relationship is the subject of considerable
and sometimes heated debate. 11  Section 2 essentially provides a
progress report on the linkages that have been found between bank
regulatory restrictiveness (or, more accurately, the degree to which
there are limits on bank-allowable activities) and bank performance.
Section 3 summarizes some issues to be addressed in future research.
1. REGULATION AND PERFORMANCE: SOME ISSUES
All the attention currently being given to the role of government
in the financial sector—its participation as owner of financial inter-
mediaries, its intervention in pricing and allocating credit, and its
role in regulating and supervising financial intermediaries—is not
surprising in view of recent events around the world. Yet for decades
the size, composition, and functioning of the financial system were
11. In March 1997, for instance, U.S. House Banking Committee Chairman
James Leach said that “Mixing commerce and banking simply doesn’t fit our kind
of democracy.” See Barth, Brumbaugh, and Yago (1997, p. 47).7 Financial Regulation and Performance
generally considered to be unimportant for economic development
and growth, and therefore usually omitted from standard macroeco-
nomic models and development texts.12 This neglect of the financial
system enabled governments more easily to use it for their own, some-
times relatively narrow, purposes. In many developing countries, for
example, collecting taxes, issuing government debt at low cost, and
allocating subsidized credit to accomplish various government goals
were the primary tasks assigned to the financial system. The result-
ing, severe financial repression in countries that operated their fi-
nancial systems in this way was a widely recognized sign of failure.
The response was greater financial liberalization, beginning in the
industrial countries and in a few developing countries in the 1970s
(although in the former group the degree of financial repression had
been negligible) and spreading more broadly in the 1980s and 1990s.
The trend toward more liberalized financial systems, however,
has not been the only development. More than 130 countries have
suffered from very costly episodes of banking problems in the past
two decades, culminating in the financial crisis in East Asia in 1997-
98. Indeed, the costs of resolving bank failures have amounted to 10,
20, and even 30 percent of GDP in various countries in recent years.13
Current attention is focused mainly on Japan, where the
nonperforming loans of banks in 1998 were estimated to be as high as
$1 trillion, with associated losses amounting to 40 to 50 percent of
this figure, according to some press reports.
Given these recent and disturbing developments, it is quite un-
derstandable that the government’s role with respect to the financial
system is receiving unprecedented attention throughout the world.
It has long been established that every government will be signifi-
cantly involved in the money supply process and, in particular, in
assigning lender-of-last-resort responsibilities to a central bank.14 The
involvement of governments in the financial system in nearly all coun-
tries has expanded beyond these areas, however. Most recently, for
example, governments in many countries have been establishing
explicit deposit insurance schemes. Overwhelmingly, governments
12. Importantly for the focus of this paper, Freixas and Rochet (1998), state
“that a microeconomic theory of banks could not exist before the foundations of
the economics of information were laid [in the early 1970s].”
13. See Caprio and Klingebiel (1997, p. 80, and 1996, p. 15) and García,
Lindgren, and Saal (1996, p. 30).
14. In this regard, see the discussion of free banking in Freixas and Rochet
(1998, pp. 260-65).James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio, Jr., and Ross Levine 8
have centered on the banking sector for substantial involvement.15
But nonbanking financial institutions have also received growing
attention since the adoption of auditing and disclosure standards by
British authorities over 100 years ago and the subsequent growth in
securities market activity.
Bank regulation used to be relatively straightforward: authori-
ties simply decided whether or not to grant charters, to limit geo-
graphical expansion, to prescribe some activities (such as the holding
of government securities), and to proscribe others (such as fraud).
Apart from these kinds of regulations, banks were largely self-regu-
lating. But even these relatively few regulations were not always
entirely benign. In the United States, for example, banking failures
were more widespread in the nineteenth century than in other
countries, mainly because of limits on intrastate and interstate branch-
ing.16 These limits on geographical expansion led to more bank fail-
ures than would otherwise have occurred. In effect, this adverse
outcome was due to faulty regulation, namely, the restriction on the
ability of banks to diversify their loan portfolios geographically.17
Bank failures occurred elsewhere, of course, but in those coun-
tries in which banks were allowed to branch and belonged to clear-
inghouses, there was better diversification and greater cooperation
in protecting banks against loan losses. This combination provided
more appropriate incentives for bankers, and in some cases for pri-
vate bank supervision (with financial incentives for supervisors), which
helped keep failure rates low even during recessions. Moreover, bank
failure rates in these types of countries (as in Canada, which allows
nationwide branching) were significantly lower than in those with
the most restrictive policies on branching.18 As Benston and
others (1986) point out, moreover, the bank failure rate in the
15. There is disagreement, however, as to whether the central bank, a sepa-
rate agency, or some combination thereof should regulate and supervise banks.
16. Some states even limited banks to a single office and were known as unit
banking states.
17. A Dutch banker’s maxim from earlier times was the “watchtower” theory:
bankers should lend only as far as they could see from the top of the watchtower
in the center of town. The reason is that such loans would be subject to risks that
the banker understood. However, the benefits of geographical diversification of
lending ultimately proved to outweigh this consideration, as the failure of unit
banks seems to indicate. Similarly, a major factor in the U.S. savings and loan
debacle was poor regulation in the form of the restriction that institutions fund
their long-term, fixed-rate home mortgage loans with shorter-term deposits. Fur-
thermore, restrictions prevented them from hedging the resulting interest rate
risk.
18. See Calomiris (1992), Gorton and Mullineaux (1987), and Bordo (1997).9 Financial Regulation and Performance
United States during 1875-1919 was lower than the failure rate
for nonfinancial firms.
Yet regardless of the fundamental causes of bank failures, it is
unlikely that the view that banking should be largely self-regulated
was any more popular in the early 1870s—when what used to be
called the Great Depression began with a financial crisis reminiscent
of the East Asian financial crisis in 1997 (see DeLong, 1998)—than in
the 1930s, when the entire U.S. banking system collapsed. Indeed,
few governments are willing to let the banking system suffer a sys-
temic run, or even to allow any of the largest banks to close. The
latter situation gives rise to the “too-big-to-fail” problem.19 When a
country’s banking system suffers a systemic run, or when insolvent
banks are allowed to remain open without any overt run, the adverse
impact on the economy is substantial. In the case of widespread bank
insolvency, even without a run, the credit system typically grinds to
a halt, and unprofitable firms are usually able to roll over their loans.
The result is a lack of funds for worthwhile investment projects and
an inefficient allocation of capital. In the case of widespread bank
runs, both the payments system and the credit system collapse, with
the economy turning to barter and standards of living plummeting
further.20 Residents of East Asia, including Japan, discovered the
direct and dire consequences of a malfunctioning credit system.
Even proponents of laissez-faire admit that, if they themselves
held policymaking positions during a crisis affecting large banks, they
most likely would ignore their own advice that no bank is too big to
fail. This situation suggests that perhaps one should consider a frame-
work for financial regulation in which one set of rules would operate
during normal times, and which would be designed to minimize the
likelihood of a financial crisis, and another set of rules would operate
when a crisis emerges. Except at the level of generalities (such as
Bagehot’s rule to discount freely and at a penalty rate), the set of
rules governing a crisis would unlikely be specific, so that its effect
both on financial sector development and on the occurrence of a
financial crisis is problematic.
19. See Baer and Klingebiel (1995) for a discussion of and evidence on the
favorable outcomes that result when depositors are allowed to incur losses from
bank failures.
20. The payments system may not collapse with insolvent banks remaining
open but not experiencing runs. If interbank exposures are covered by implicit or
explicit deposit insurance, the payments system will likely continue to function.
When interbank exposures are not covered, solvent banks will curtail and avoid
exposure to insolvent banks, thereby impeding the efficient operation of the pay-
ments system.James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio, Jr., and Ross Levine 10
The design of an appropriate regulatory environment during
normal times, however, is more tractable. Nevertheless, the issue
is certainly not simple. The existence of information asymmetries,
coupled with intertemporal transactions, introduces complexities into
a financial system. Indeed, without problems of incomplete and im-
perfect information, a financial system would be easy to regulate be-
cause it would be quite trivial. But this is not the case. Banks are
therefore quite difficult to regulate: information problems affect all
participants, whether they be creditors, shareholders, senior bank
managers, or even regulators.
A consensus does appear to be emerging that, because of the
inherent difficulty of monitoring financial intermediaries, the regu-
latory environment needs to change in such a way that there will be
several “watchful eyes,” that is, participants in the financial market-
place with information about banks available to them and the incen-
tives to act on it. Some countries have already found merit in this
approach and operationalized it. Argentina, for example, has increased
capital requirements and set a minimum that is tied to indicators of
credit and market risk; required banks to issue subordinated debt;
strengthened accounting and disclosure requirements; mandated
external bank audits; and, more generally, improved supervision. Col-
lectively, these reforms in bank regulation mean that owners, credi-
tors, and supervisors are more likely to monitor banks effectively.
Although the general direction in which many countries need to
move with respect to banking reforms is clear, the appropriate mix of
all the different components of regulation and supervision is only
now becoming a subject of research. For a relatively few countries,
some attempts have been made to provide a comparative ranking of
selected features of bank regulation.21 There is some indication, al-
though necessarily significantly qualified because of limited data avail-
ability, that a tighter regulatory environment (that is, one with tougher
capital and liquidity standards, stricter definitions of capital and
nonperforming loans, more widespread mandatory provisioning once
a loan is nonperforming, a greater presence of foreign banks, and a
more transparent and better operating environment) will help bank-
ing systems survive crises.
Another important aspect of regulation that has received even
less attention recently, and which the next section attempts to ad-
dress, is the allowable activities of banks. For example, do banks that
21. See, for example, Caprio (1998b) and JP Morgan (1997).11 Financial Regulation and Performance
are allowed to engage in financial activities beyond less traditional
commercial banking activities—such as securities underwriting and
dealing, insurance underwriting and brokerage, real estate invest-
ment and development, and ownership and control of nonfinancial
firms—intermediate more efficiently, and are they less prone to
crisis? The answer is not clear. Proponents of the separation of
commercial and investment banking in the United States during
the 1930s argued that there are inherent conflicts of interest be-
tween the two businesses, notwithstanding the fact that anything
other than arm’s-length transactions would be bad for business
over the long term. Kroszner and Rajan (1994), however, find no
empirical evidence to support the view that problems arise from
the potential conflict of interest.
Furthermore, White (1986), among others, maintains that uni-
versal banks may be better diversified and hence more stable. Yet
some bank supervisors argue that combining traditional and nontra-
ditional activities makes banks harder for the regulatory authorities
to supervise. In addition, Rajan (1998) suggests that allowing banks
to engage in a wide range of activities increases the difficulty of moni-
toring by market participants. The implication of this view is that
harder-to-monitor banks are more likely to pose problems. Indeed,
Rajan more generally urges emerging market countries that are con-
sidering allowing universal banking to proceed cautiously, while also
indicating the need for further empirical research in this area. This
paper attempts to begin this research effort by investigating the im-
pact of selected bank regulatory restrictions on various measures of
performance. We defer to future research an assessment of the link-
ages between the broader regulatory environment and the financial
sector and, more generally, economic outcomes.
2. REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS, GOVERNMENTAL
BUREAUCRACY, AND BANKING SECTOR PERFORMANCE
This section empirically examines the interrelationships among
regulatory restrictions on the activities of banks, the ability of gov-
ernments and bureaucratic systems to operate effectively, the level
of development and efficiency of the banking sector, and the fragility
of the banking system. This examination is based upon newly as-
sembled data for a cross section of forty-five countries. The fol-
lowing three questions are addressed:James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio, Jr., and Ross Levine 12
• Do countries with relatively weak governmental or bureau-
cratic systems (measured in terms of corruption, bureaucratic red
tape, and the degree to which a country holds to the rule of law)
impose harsher regulatory restrictions on the activities of banks
(measured in terms of allowable securities activities, insurance
activities, real estate activities, and ownership of nonfinancial
firms)?
• Do countries with relatively restrictive regulatory systems
have poorer functioning banking systems, as measured by deposit
money bank credit to the private sector relative to GDP, bank
overhead expenditure relative to total assets, and net interest in-
come relative to total assets?
• Do countries with relatively restrictive regulatory systems
have lower probabilities of suffering a banking crisis (defined as a
situation where the estimated losses from bank failures exceed 5
percent of GDP)?
Cross-country evaluations of national regulatory regimes form
the basis for answering all three questions. The first subsection
describes our assessment of the restrictiveness of national regula-
tory systems. The second subsection discusses measures of the
strength of governmental and bureaucratic systems. The subse-
quent subsections report the evidence pertaining to each of the
above three questions.
2.1 Regulatory Restrictions on Bank Activities
We constructed quantitative data on the allowable nontradi-
tional activities of banks using information from Barth, Nolle, and
Rice (1997), Kyei (1995), Akamatsu (1995), the Institute of Inter-
national Bankers Global Surveys (various years), the  Euromoney
Banking Yearbook  for 1995, and various central bank and govern-
ment sources. These data form the basis for our assessment of the
restrictiveness of national regulatory systems.
The empirical analysis is based upon the degree to which a
country’s regulatory system allows banks to engage in the follow-
ing four nontraditional activities:
• SECURITIES: the ability of banks to engage in the businesses
of securities underwriting, brokering, dealing, and all aspects of
the mutual fund business.13 Financial Regulation and Performance
• INSURANCE: the ability of banks to engage in insurance
underwriting and selling
• REAL ESTATE: the ability of banks to engage in real estate
investment, development, and management, and
• NONFINANCIAL FIRM OWNERSHIP: the ability of banks to
own and control nonfinancial firms.
On the basis of an analysis of available documents, each country’s
regulations concerning these nontraditional activities have been as-
sessed. These assessments are used to assign a number between 1
and 4 to each of the four activities that indicates the degree of regu-
latory restrictiveness for that activity in each country. The assigned
numbers are interpreted as follows:
1 = unrestricted: banks may engage in the full range of the ac-
tivity directly within the bank
2 = permitted: the full range of activities may be conducted, but
all or some of the activity must be conducted in subsidiaries
3 = restricted: banks may engage in less than the full range of
the activity, either in the bank or in subsidiaries, and
4 = prohibited: the activity may not be conducted by the bank or
by subsidiaries.
The numerical scores assigned to each of the four activities for
the countries in our sample are summarized in appendix table A1.
A summary index was also computed for the country’s overall regula-
tory restrictiveness toward all four activities. The index, RESTRICT,
equals the average of each country’s scores for SECURITIES, IN-
SURANCE, REAL ESTATE, and NONFINANCIAL FIRM OWNER-
SHIP and can therefore take on values between 1 (least restrictive)
and 4 (most restrictive). The average value of RESTRICT is 2.2, with
a standard deviation of 0.6. Five countries have very restrictive regu-
latory systems (RESTRICT > 3): Chile, Ecuador, Indonesia, Japan,
and Peru. Six countries have very permissive systems (RESTRICT <
1.5): Austria, Israel, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom. The United States has a value of 3.
These data on regulatory restrictiveness clearly involve some de-
gree of subjectivity. As more detailed and comprehensive informa-
tion becomes available, we will therefore update the data and the
results that follow. Nonetheless, the currently available data and theJames R. Barth, Gerard Caprio, Jr., and Ross Levine 14
approach taken provide new and useful—although certainly not
unassailable—information regarding the interrelationships among
regulatory regimes, governmental and bureaucratic systems, bank-
ing sector development, and especially banking sector fragility.
2.2 Governmental and Bureaucratic Systems
Information about the effectiveness of governmental and bureau-
cratic systems is used for two reasons. First, the paper seeks to
assess the relationship between the quality of the governmental bu-
reaucracy and the restrictiveness of the regulatory regime. To
perform such an assessment, one needs quantitative measures re-
garding the manner in which the government operates. Second, the
paper seeks to assess the relationship between the restrictiveness of
the regulatory regime and both banking sector development and the
fragility of the banking system. To make this assessment, one needs
to control for other factors. Specifically, one needs to control for the
overall effectiveness of the governmental and bureaucratic system,
to determine the extent to which there is an independent link
between a country’s regulatory restrictiveness, on one hand, and
its banking sector development and the fragility of its banking
system, on the other. For these reasons measures of the way in
which a governmental and bureaucratic system functions are used
in conducting our analyses.
Numerous measures of the functioning of the government were
considered, but the focus is on the following three:
• REDTAPE, which represents an assessment of the degree to
which the governmental bureaucracy is an obstacle to business.
Higher values of REDTAPE represent less red tape and a more
smoothly functioning bureaucracy.22  REDTAPE takes on values
between 1 and 10.
• CORRUPT, which represents an assessment of corruption in
government. Higher values of CORRUPT indicate that high gov-
ernment officials are less likely to demand special payments for
performing various services and signify that illegal payments are
generally less common throughout government. CORRUPT takes
on values between 1 and 10.
22. Data for REDTAPE are obtained from the Business International Corpo-
ration and cover the early 1980s. For more information see Mauro (1995).15 Financial Regulation and Performance
• RULELAW, which represents an assessment of the law and
order tradition in the country as determined by the  International
Country Risk Guide. Higher values of RULELAW indicate that a coun-
try adheres to the rule of law to a greater degree than countries with
lower values. RULELAW takes on values between 1 and 10.23
In addition, we consider GOVERNMENT, which is a composite
index of the quality of the governmental and bureaucratic system
and equals the average value of REDTAPE, CORRUPT, and
RULELAW. This means that higher values of GOVERNMENT
indicate better-functioning governments. The average value of GOV-
ERNMENT for the countries in our sample is 7.0, with a standard
deviation of 2.3. Three countries have values of 10 for GOVERNMENT:
the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Switzerland. The United States
has a value of 9.3, and Chile has a value of 7.2. Six countries have
values below 4, indicating very poor governmental and bureaucratic
systems: Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and the Phil-
ippines. Other measures of the governmental and bureaucratic
system were considered, including assessments of the risk of govern-
ment repudiation of contracts, assessments of the risk of government
expropriation of private property, and assessments of the efficiency
of the judiciary system. Incorporating these alternative indicators
into the analyses does not change any of the results that follow,
however.
2.3 Regulatory Restrictiveness and Quality of  the
Governmental and Bureaucratic System
This subsection addresses the first question above: Do countries
with relatively weak governmental and bureaucratic systems im-
pose harsher regulatory restrictions on the activities of banks?
Table 1 shows that countries with better government systems
(higher values of GOVERNMENT) on average have less restrictive
regulatory systems (lower values of RESTRICT). The negative rela-
tionship between better government and regulatory restrictions is
strongest for REAL ESTATE and NONFINANCIAL FIRM
23. Data for CORRUPT and RULELAW cover the period 1982-95 and are
taken from LaPorta and others (1998), who obtained the data from the Interna-
tional Country Risk Guide.James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio, Jr., and Ross Levine 16
Simple correlations
Government c –0.436 –0.220 –0.207 –0.364 –0.449
(0.004) (0.140) (0.144) (0.037) (0.007)
Regressions
Constant 3.778 0.977 7.468 3.622 2.323
(0.006) (0.579) (0.000) (0.052) (0.322)
ECONOMIC –0.044 0.215 –0.638 0.047 0.317
DEVELOPMENT (0.813) (0.430) (0.020) (0.853) (0.379)
REVOLUTION –1.009 –0.674 –0.840 –1.376 –1.420
AND COUPS (0.001) (0.023) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011)
GOVERNMENT –0.156 –0.162 0.078 –0.206 –0.370
(0.008) (0.083) (0.323) (0.008) (0.007)
Summary statistic
R 2 0.33 0.12 0.18 0.23 0.29
P value (F statistic) 0.00 0.17 0.05 0.01 0.00
OWNERSHIP.24 Table 1 also shows that these findings remain un-
changed even after controlling both for the level of economic devel-
opment and for political stability.25 Thus countries with
better-functioning governments—less red tape, less corruption, and
a stronger rule of law—on average allow banks the opportunity to
provide their customers a wider array of nontraditional services.26
These findings suggest that it is possible to substitute among
different government mechanisms for overseeing bank behavior.
This is consistent with recent work on legal systems. LaPorta and
others (1998), for instance, find that countries with legal systems
that impede minority shareholders from exerting their rights are
more likely to introduce mandatory dividends. Our findings indi-
cate that countries with weak governments—that is, governments
Table 1. Evidence on the Relationship between Regulatory
Restrictiveness and the Quality of Governmental and
Bureaucratic Systemsa
24. We also examined accounting standards. The correlation between ac-
counting standards and regulatory restrictiveness is -0.44, with a p value of 0.005,
and the relationship remains significant at the 1 percent level after controlling for
GDP per capita and measures of political stability.
25. To measure the level of economic development, the logarithm of real GDP
per capita is used. Political instability is a measure of revolutions and coups, ob-
tained from Banks (1994).
26. These results also hold for the individual components of GOVERNMENT.
  NONFINANCIAL




a. Numbers in parentheses are p values. Variables not defined below are defined in the text.
b. Average of SECURITIES, INSURANCE, REAL ESTATE, and NONFINANCIAL FIRM OWNERSHIP.
c. Average of REDTAPE, CORRUPT, and RULELAW.17 Financial Regulation and Performance
that are less likely to supervise banks approximately or to  create
proper incentives for private sector participants to supervise
banks—also on average impose harsher restrictions on the activi-
ties of banks.27  Of course, a third factor may be responsible for
both effects. Political constraints, for instance, may prevent a gov-
ernment from both improving the operation of the bureaucracy
and relaxing regulatory restrictions on the activities of banks.
2.4 Regulatory Restrictiveness and Banking Sector
Development and Efficiency
This subsection addresses the second question: Do countries with
more restrictive regulatory systems have poorer-functioning bank-
ing systems, as measured by deposit money bank credit to the pri-
vate sector relative to GDP, bank overhead expenditures relative to
total assets, and net interest income relative to total assets?
To assess the relationship between regulatory restrictiveness and
banking sector development and efficiency, the following commonly
employed measures of the latter variables are used:
• PRIVATE CREDIT, which is deposit money bank credit to the
private sector relative to GDP
• OVERHEAD, which is bank overhead expenditures relative to
total assets, and
• NET INTEREST, which is net interest income relative to total
assets.28
Levine (1998) and Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) find that
PRIVATE CREDIT exerts a causal and positive impact on long-run
economic growth. Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine, and Min (1998) find that
OVERHEAD is also closely associated with more rapid economic
growth in a broad cross section of countries. Many researchers,
moreover, use various indicators of interest rate margins, such as
NET INTEREST, to assess banking sector efficiency.29
27. We collected more detailed information on supervisory systems, which is
permitting a more precise evaluation of this hypothesis. See Barth, Caprio, and
Levine (2001a, b, c).
28. PRIVATE CREDIT is from Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000). It is an aver-
age over the period 1980-95. See also Levine (1998). OVERHEAD and NET IN-
TEREST are from Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine, and Min (1998). The underlying data
stem from individual financial statements provided by BankScope and are aver-
aged over the period 1985-95.
29. See, for example, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999).James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio, Jr., and Ross Levine 18
Table 2 presents mixed results regarding the relationship be-
tween the degree of regulatory restrictiveness and banking sector
development and efficiency. Although countries with more restric-
tive regulations on average have less bank credit, greater overhead
expenditures, and greater net interest income, the correlations are
not very robust. For instance, even though RESTRICT and PRI-
VATE CREDIT are significantly negatively correlated, this relation-
ship breaks down when one controls for the level of economic devel-
opment and political stability. Similarly, of the regulatory restric-
tiveness indicators, OVERHEAD is significantly correlated only with
NONFINANCIAL FIRM OWNERSHIP, but even this relationship
becomes insignificant when one controls for the level of economic
development and political stability. Greater regulatory restrictive-
ness does remain positively correlated with NET INTEREST, how-
ever, even when one controls for these other factors. Yet this result
mainly runs through REAL ESTATE and NONFINANCIAL FIRM
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. Numbers in parentheses are p values. Variables are as defined in table 1 and in the text.
Table 2. Evidence on the Relationship between Regulatory
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OWNERSHIP. The finding may therefore be simply due to the fact
that harsher restrictions on real estate and nonfinancial firm own-
ership cause total assets of the banking sector to be less than other-
wise, thereby increasing NET INTEREST. The relationship may, in
other words, have nothing to do with interest rate spreads per se.30
Thus this preliminary analysis suggests that there is not a reliable
and direct link between the degree of regulatory restrictiveness
and widely used measures of banking sector development and effi-
ciency. For recent extensions, see Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001b).
2.5 Regulatory Restrictiveness and Banking Crises
This subsection addresses the third question: Do countries with
more restrictive regulatory systems have a lower probability of suf-
fering a banking crisis?
To assess the impact of regulatory restrictiveness on banking sector
fragility, two measures of whether a country’s banking system has
suffered a crisis during the last fifteen years are used. First, a coun-
try is considered to have experienced a crisis when the estimated
losses to the government due to banking sector problems exceeded
5 percent of GDP. Second, to provide a more general indicator of
fragility, a country is considered to have experienced a crisis when
the banking system is judged to be insolvent, even if eventual losses
are less than 5 percent of GDP. Since both indicators produce similar
results, only results based upon the first measure are reported here;
that is, a country is considered to have experienced a crisis only when
the estimated losses were greater than 5 percent of GDP.
The empirical results indicate a positive relationship between the
degree of regulatory restrictiveness—especially restrictions on the
securities activities of banks—and banking sector fragility. The rela-
tionships between banking crises and both the governmental and
bureaucratic system and the regulatory environment are exam-
ined using both simple correlations and probit regressions. Table
3 presents the results based on the correlations. A positive link is
seen between banking sector crises and the stringency of restric-
tions on banks’ activities in the securities market business. Also,
there is a significantly negative correlation between banking sec-
tor crises and good governmental and bureaucratic systems.
30. Unfortunately, the BankScope data available to us do not include interest
rate spreads, but only interest income and interest expenses.James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio, Jr., and Ross Levine 20
The empirical results based upon the probit regressions sup-
port the contention that countries restricting the securities ac-
tivities of banks have a significantly higher probability of suffering
a banking crisis than do countries that allow banks greater free-
dom to engage in these activities. Table 4 presents the results
based on the probit regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy
variable called CRISIS, which equals 1 if a country has suffered a
banking crisis and 0 otherwise.
In the probit regressions, a wide array of control variables are
included to more accurately assess whether there is an independent
link between banking crises and the degree of regulatory restrictive-
ness on the activities of banks. In particular, we control for the qual-
ity of both the governmental and bureaucratic system and
accounting standards, since a close connection is observed among
poor government systems, poor accounting standards, and harsher
regulatory restrictiveness. Importantly, a significant link is found
between the harshness of bank securities restrictions and the likeli-
hood of a banking crisis, even after controlling for these institutional
Table 3. Evidence on the Relationship among Banking
Crises, Governmental and Bureaucratic Systems, and
Regulatory Restrictivenessa
Source: Authors´ calculations.
a. Numbers in parentheses are p values.
b. Equals 1 when the estimated cost of a banking crisis is greater than 5 percent of GDP, and 0 otherwise. Sample
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factors. We also control for the degree to which legal codes empha-
size the rights of secured creditors and minority shareholders, since
the contracting environment may influence the incentives facing
bank managers and pressures for regulatory intervention. Even af-
ter controlling for these legal characteristics, however, the findings
still indicate that greater restrictions on the securities activities of
banks produce a significantly higher probability of a banking crisis.
As an additional check on the robustness of this finding, we
control for the overall level of economic development and the devel-
opment of the financial system by including measures of the level of
GDP per capita, the recent economic growth rate, and the size of the
banking system. After controlling for these economic and financial
development indicators, the legal characteristics, and the institutional
variables, the results still indicate that countries that restrict the
securities activities of banks have a significantly higher probability of
suffering a banking crisis than do countries with less restrictive regu-
latory practices. Furthermore, an attempt was made to control for
bank franchise value by including measures of the net interest in-
come of banks (NET INTEREST MARGIN) and the concentration of
the banking sector, which equals the percentage of total banking sys-
tem assets accounted for by the five largest banks. Again, the
findings remain unchanged: a positive and statistically significant
Table 4. Explaining the Likelihood of Banking Crises: Probit
Regressions with Bank Securities Restrictions and Bank
Composite Regulatory Restrictionsa
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. The dependent variable is CRISIS, which is defined as in table 3. Numbers in parentheses are p values.
ACCOUNT is a measure of accounting standards, INITIAL INCOME is based on GDP per capita, and GROWTH
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relationship exists between the harshness of restrictions on the
securities activities of banks and a banking sector crisis.31
There may be concerns about endogeneity. Countries with a frag-
ile banking system may adopt restrictive banking sector regulations.
Thus the probit results in table 4 may suffer from simultaneity bias.
To control for this bias, we use a two-step instrumental variables
estimator.32 We tried a number of different instrumental variables.
Here we report the results using the legal origin of each country as
an instrumental variable for regulatory restrictiveness. Legal scholars
have shown that much of the world can be divided into countries
with either an English, French, German, or Scandinavian legal heri-
tage. Since a country’s legal heritage was determined far in the past
and was frequently driven by colonization and conquest, we can treat
legal heritage as exogenous to whether the country has experienced
a banking crisis recently. Moreover, the origin of a country’s legal
system has a profound effect on the specific laws, regulations, and
enforcement mechanisms that govern financial sector activities
(LaPorta and others, 1998). Thus we use an instrumental variables
probit estimator to gauge the causal impact of regulatory restric-
tiveness on banking sector fragility.
The results in table 5 indicate that simultaneity bias is not
driving the positive relationship between restrictions on banks en-
gaging in securities market activities and banking sector fragility.
That is, the finding remains that when banks face greater restric-
tions on their ability to engage in securities market activities, they
have a higher probability of suffering a banking crisis. Although
the data provide less confident results on bank restrictiveness in
general, they are consistent with the view that lowering restric-
tions on the securities market activities of banks will boost rather
than jeopardize banking sector stability.
The relationship between regulatory restrictions on the activi-
ties of banks and banking system crises, moreover, is economically
quite large. The coefficient estimates suggest that a rise in restric-
tiveness by 1 index unit (for example, the characterization of
31. We also included a dummy variable indicating whether a country has an
explicit deposit insurance scheme, since Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1997,
1998) find that deposit insurance regimes are positively associated with banking
crises. The inclusion of this variable does not change our findings regarding regu-
latory restrictions on bank securities activities.
32. The instrumental variables estimator is analogous to the two-stage least
squares, except that it must be appropriately modified to a limited dependent
variable framework. This is described in Maddala (1983).23 Financial Regulation and Performance
regulation on banks’ securities activities changes from “permitted”
to “restricted”) increases the probability of a banking crisis by be-
tween 25 and 33 percentage points, depending on the specific con-
trol variables included. (This particular evaluation is based upon
the mean values of the variables in the regression equation.)33 Thus,
in addition to being statistically significant, the empirical results
suggest that restricting the ability of banks to diversify their activi-
ties influences their fragility in an economically important manner.
The finding that restrictions on the securities activities of banks
on average significantly increase the likelihood of banking sector fra-
gility is consistent with evaluations of events during the Great
Depression in the United States. White (1983, 1986), for example,
shows that banks that were engaged in investment banking activities
during the 1930s were better diversified and thus less likely to fail
than banks that were not involved in the securities market business.34
33. Since the probit technique is a nonlinear estimation procedure, the im-
plied effect of a given change in SECURITIES on the probability of a crisis is
nonlinear and depends on the precise characteristics of the individual country
involved in the conceptual experiment.
34. Note that in the United States in the period before the enactment of the
Glass-Steagall Act, big banks were most likely to be involved in investment bank-
ing activities. This confounds some of White’s (1983, 1986) analyses. In our study,
however, we study the whole regulatory regime, which reduces this complication.
Also see Kroszner and Rajan (1994) and Rajan (1998).
Table 5. Explaining the Likelihood of Banking Crises:
Instrumental Variables Regressions with Bank Securities
Restrictions and Bank Composite Regulatory Restrictionsa
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. A variable indicating the origin of the legal system (English, French, German, or Scandinavian) was used as
the instrument for the regulatory restrictiveness variables. Other variables in the conditioning information set
are treated as exogenous. The dependent variable is CRISIS, which is defined as in table 3. Numbers in paren-
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Although more research surely is needed, these results suggest
that, even after controlling for many relevant features of national
economies, allowing banks greater freedom to engage in securities
activities reduces the likelihood of banking crises.
3. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
A more extensive data set, in terms of both the variables included
and the range of countries, will enable us to provide better informa-
tion and thus better advice on appropriate regulatory reforms. For
example, our finding that banks with more diversified powers are
less likely to suffer a banking crisis may be sensitive to other compo-
nents of the regulatory environment, which for now are omitted vari-
ables in our analysis. It may be that countries that allow broader
powers to banks, for example, also have higher capital requirements
or better supervision. Or it may be that they are the countries that
have more foreign banks, which may well be better at risk manage-
ment. One should also consider the organizational structure of banks
that engage in a wider range of activities. Whether the activities are
conducted within the bank itself or through subsidiaries or affili-
ates may matter. More generally, it seems increasingly clear that
the new global and technological environment requires regulation
and supervision that focuses on the performance of the financial
system as a whole. One should therefore consider the extent to
which regulations directed at one specific component of a country’s
financial system spill over to other components as well as to the
financial systems of other countries. In any event, in order to in-
crease the robustness of any policy recommendations, these types
of extensions are important and will be the subject of future re-
search. See Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001a, b, c).25 Financial Regulation and Performance
Argentina 3 2 2 3 2.50
Australia 1 2 3 2 2.00
Austria 1 2 1 1 1.25
Belgium 2 2 3 3 2.50
Brazil 2 2 3 3 2.50
Canada 2 2 2 3 2.25
Chile 2 3 4 4 3.25
Colombia 2 2 2 4 2.50
Denmark 1 2 2 2 1.75
Ecuador 2 4 4 n.a. 3.33
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2 2 3 3 2.50
Finland 1 3 2 1 1.75
France 1 2 2 1 1.50
Germany 1 3 2 1 1.75
Greece 2 3 3 1 2.25
Hong Kong (China) 1 2 2 3 2.00
India 2 4 3 3 3.00
Indonesia 2 4 4 4 3.50
Ireland 1 4 1 1 1.75
Israel 1 1 1 1 1.00
Italy 1 2 3 3 2.25
Japan 3 4 3 3 3.25
Korea, Rep. of 2 2 2 3 2.25
Malaysia 1 1 1 2 1.25
Mexico 2 2 3 4 2.75
Netherlands 1 2 2 1 1.50
New Zealand 2 2 2 1 1.75
Nigeria 1 2 2 2 1.75
Norway 2 2 2 2 2.00
Pakistan 2 4 3 2 2.75
Peru 2 4 3 4 3.25
Philippines 1 2 2 2 1.75
Portugal 1 2 3 2 2.00
Singapore 2 2 2 3 2.25
South Africa 1 2 3 2 2.00
Spain 1 2 3 1 1.75
Sri Lanka 1 1 1.00
Sweden 1 2 3 3 2.25
Switzerland 1 2 1 1 1.25
Thailand 2 2 2 3 2.25
Turkey 1 2 4 3 2.50
United Kingdom 1 2 1 1 1.25
United States 3 3 3 3 3.00
Uruguay 3 2 3 4 3.00
Venezuela 2 2 3 3 2.50
Table A1. Quantitative Measures of Regulatory
Restrictiveness for the Countries in the Sample





Source: Authors’ calculations based on Barth, Nolle, and Rice (1997), Kyei (1995), Akamatsu (1995), Institute of
International Bankers Global Survey (various years), Euromoney Banking Yearbook 1995, and various central
bank and government sources.
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